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THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
OF TRUST INVESTMENT LAW:
JUXTAPOSING NIGERIAN LAW
WITH CURRENT TRENDS IN
OTHER COMMON LAW
JURISDICTIONS

DR. LARRY O.C. CHUKWU*

ABSTRACT
Over the centuries, common law jurists and scholars have propounded
theories and principles which underpin the conduct of the investment
duty of trustees. This article offers a comparative analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of trust investment law as applicable in Nigeria vis-àvis the current trends in other jurisdictions. It concludes that the Nigerian
law is hopelessly lagging behind and proffers recommendations for
reform.
INTRODUCTION
Almost every express trust – whether a private or public trust – requires
a trustee to make an investment, even if only to lodge trust funds in an
interest-bearing bank account. Right from the earliest times, the duty to
invest has always been an intrinsic feature of trusteeship, thus ordinarily
requiring no express direction to the trustee. So important is the investment duty that it has an inextricable correlation with most of the other
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duties and powers of a trustee. This is especially true of those trusts
whose primary purpose is to confer financial benefits on the beneficiaries. Indeed, the life of virtually all such trusts lies in the prudent discharge of this duty. Dereliction or imprudent execution of the duty has
tolled the death knell of many a trust, with disastrous consequences to
the beneficiaries and often to the trustees themselves. Usually, the question is not whether a trustee is permitted to make an investment with trust
funds, but whether he is permitted to make a particular type of investment. Prudence, however, has always been the watchword for trustee
investment practice.
The theoretical underpinnings of trust investment laws over the centuries
can be reduced to two doctrines – the “authorized list” principle and
“prudent man” rule. In preference to the straitjacket placed on trustees by
those traditional trust doctrines, the “modern portfolio theory,” which
was developed in the second half of the last century, has influenced the
virtual enthronement of libertarianism in trustee investment regulation in
most common law jurisdictions. This work presents an overview of the
general principles guiding trust investment under the Nigerian law, comparing those with the current positions in other jurisdictions which have
advanced beyond the primordial doctrines.1 The presentation is in three
parts. Part 1 lays the conceptual and philosophical foundations; Part 2
examines the basic principles governing the exercise of the trustee’s duty
of investment; while Part 3 bears the concluding remarks.
I. CONCEPTUAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
A. NATURE, BASIS

AND

EXTENT

OF

TRUSTEE’S DUTY

OF

INVESTMENT

The power of a trustee to invest trust funds goes beyond a mere power. It
is, indeed, an imperative duty, which a trustee fails or neglects to discharge at the risk of incurring trust liability. Thus, even in the absence of
an express provision in the trust instrument, equity imposes a duty on a

1.
Although the Nigerian trust investment law is outmoded, as will be demonstrated presently,
it is way ahead of the positions in other common law African countries. Even our closest contemporary, Ghana, whose legal development has been practically moving in tandem with ours, has never
enacted any local trust investment statute. Rather, it remains stuck with the old English law in force
on July 24, 1874, which was foisted upon Ghana and Nigeria by the Supreme Court Ordinance (No.
4), 1876 of Gold Coast and Lagos Colonies.
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trustee (except, perhaps, a bare trustee2) to invest the trust fund rather
than leave it dormant.3 As Professor Maitland perceptively observed:
Almost every settlement throws upon the trustees the duty of
investing money. And even if there is no express declaration
that money is to be invested still it is a general rule that if trustees have money in their hands and are not bound at once to
apply it in some other way, e.g. in paying it over to the beneficiaries, they ought to invest it and so make it profitable; if they
retain it uninvested for a longer time than is reasonable then this
will be a breach of trust.4
Perhaps, the fons et origo of this doctrine is traceable to the Holy Bible.5
Jesus Christ illustrated God’s relationship with man with the story of a
wealthy man who, upon journeying to a distant land, appointed his servants as trustees of his property. To one he gave five talents,6 to another
two talents, and to the third trustee one talent. The first two trustees
traded with their respective trust funds and, when the settlor demanded
an account, they turned in double the amounts entrusted to them. The
third buried his talent in the ground and, on the day of accounts settlement, he exhumed the same and gave it back to the settlor. His excuse for
not investing the trust fund was that he was afraid of his hard and greedy
master and so would rather not risk investment with his money. Exasperated, the master retorted: “You wicked and slothful servant! . . . Then
you ought to have invested my money with the bankers, and at my coming I should have received what was my own with interest.”7 The two
faithful trustees were commended for their prudent stewardship, while
the “wicked and slothful” one was not only removed from office but also
severely sanctioned.
2.
As has been observed, “Because time is essential to sound investment and time is not a
feature of a bare trust, a ‘bare’ trust can, in no meaningful sense, be ‘invested’.” G. WATT, TRUSTS
AND EQUITY, 401 (Oxford Univ. Press 4th ed. 2010).
3.
Stone v. Stone, (1869) 5 Ch.App. 74 (Eng.); New England Trust Co. v. Triggs, 334 Mass.
324, 135 N.E.2d 541 (1956), aff’d, 337 Mass. 482 (1958) (U.S.).
4.
F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 99 (A. H. Chaytor & W. J. Whittaker
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1909).
5.
Matthew 25:14–30 (Revised Standard); Luke 19:11–27 (Revised Standard). By contrast,
Professor Yakubu notes that under Islamic law trustees are prohibited from investing trust funds,
unless expressly authorized to do so by the trust instrument or the beneficiaries, for Islamic law
regards every investment as hazardous. See M. Yakubu, The Standard Duty of Care of Trustees, in
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND THEIR USES IN NIGERIA 36 (A. A. Utuama & G. M. Ibru eds., Malthouse
Press 2004) 36.
6.
Ancient Jewish currency.
7.
Matthew 25:27; Luke 19:23.
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Indeed, from the above passage, otherwise known as “Parable of Talents,” it would appear that the trust concept has Biblical, rather than English, origins, contrary to the claim of English authorities.8 Thus, from
the passage, at least three fundamental principles of modern trust law
relating to the trustee’s duty of investment can be distilled. First, it is
both an inherent power and a paramount duty of a trustee to invest trust
funds, even in the absence of an express direction.9 Secondly, if he cannot carry out any specified investment or a more productive investment,
he should at least deposit the trust funds in an interest-bearing bank account.10 Thirdly, a breach of trust concerning the investment duty may
lead to the removal11 of a trustee and/or attract penal sanctions12 upon
him. In addition to these sanctions, under the principles of equity, the
defaulting trustee may be subjected to a civil liability to pay the interest
which the trust fund would have earned,13 or the difference between the
amount returned and the value which a prudent trustee is likely to have
turned in (a reliable index being the returns made by the other two
trustees).14
As a general rule, therefore, a trustee who refrains from investing trust
funds in his hands, ipso facto, commits a breach of trust. It is no excuse
that the trustee decided to err on the side of caution so as to avoid the risk
of a loss. A ship in harbor is safe; but that is not what ships are built for.
By the same token, money buried in the ground or locked up in a fireproof vault may be secure, but it has no way of multiplying or adding
value to life, which is what money is meant for. It may even depreciate in
real value over time as a result of inflation, devaluation or other economic vagaries. Moreover, money buried in the ground or stored in the
house can be eaten up by termites (if it is paper currency) or stolen; in
either case, the trustee will be liable to make good the loss to the beneficiaries.15 On the contrary, if a trustee, acting as an ordinary prudent man,
properly invests trust funds, he will not be held liable for any resulting
8.
The earliest trace of the origin of the common law, which was the precursor of equity, was
after the Norman Conquest of 1066 A.D., and uses, the forebears of the modern trusts, did not
emerge until about the 14th century. See F.W. MAITLAND, supra note 4, at Lectures I–III.
9.
There is no indication in Matthew’s account that the trustees were expressly directed to
invest the trust funds. By Luke’s account, however, they were so directed. See Luke 19:13.
10.
Ex p. Belchier (1754) Amb. 218; 27 E.R. 144; Ex p. Kingston (1871) 6 Ch. App. 632.
11.
Matthew 25:28; Re Smith (1971) 18 D.L.R. (3d) 405; Estate of Cooper, 913 P. 2d 393
(1996).
12.
Matthew 25:30; Pension Reform Act, 2014, Pt. XIV; Criminal Code, § 434; Penal Code,
§ 311 (criminal breach of trust).
13.
Pride v. Fooks, (1840) 2 Beav. 430; Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2), [1975] Q.B. 373 at 397
(Eng.).
14.
Nestle v. National Westminster Bank plc, [1994] 1 All E.R. 118 at 138 (Eng.).
15.
Caffrey v. Darby, (1801) 6 Ves. Jr. 488 at 496; Cann v. Cann, (1884) 33 W.R. 40 (Eng.).

https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol22/iss1/7

4

Chukwu: Underpinnings of Trust Investment Law

2017]

UNDERPINNINGS OF TRUST INVESTMENT LAW

77

loss, for there is inherent in every investment the risk of a possible loss,
however prudent the investor might be.16
Indeed, the rationale for casting upon a trustee an inflexible duty to invest is not hard to demonstrate. There may be, as is often the case, expenses and liabilities to settle out of the trust estate. Leaving the trust
fund idle will entail defraying those outgoings from the capital whereby
it would be dissipated over time, leaving little or nothing for the beneficiaries. Furthermore, the nature of the trust property or the different classes of beneficiary may make it imperative for the trustee to invest or sell
and re-invest the assets. Where the trust estate or part of it consists of
fungibles or other wasting assets, it is the trustee’s duty to exercise special care to preserve such assets and, if it becomes impracticable or imprudent to retain them without considerable risks of deterioration or
depletion, he must realize them and re-invest the proceeds. If, for example, the trust asset is a poultry-farm and there is an outbreak of avian
influenza in the neighborhood, should the trustee leave the chickens with
the impending danger of all of them being consumed by the influenza?
Of course, he cannot be heard to say “I know that the poultry are dangerously threatened by the ravaging influenza, but I am helpless because
there is no express direction for me to sell them.” Clearly, that will be
tantamount to what one learned commentator termed “a pusillanimous
abdication of responsibilities in the modern world.”17 Acting as an ordinary prudent man of business, the trustee ought to sell off the chickens.
And, if he does so, he must not bury the proceeds, like the “wicked and
slothful” trustee in the Parable of Talents, or store the money under his
mattress, like one-time Governor of Kano State who earned an infamous
reputation for “keeping Government money in Government House.” Unless the trust has come to an end, or he is bound at once to apply it in
some other way, he is under a duty to invest the proceeds of the sale.
B. MEANING

OF

INVESTMENT

It appears that there is no statutory definition of the term “investment”
under both the Nigerian and English laws. However, a judicial definition
can be found in the English case of Re Wragg,18 where P. O. Lawrence,
J., (as he then was) stated that one of the meanings of investment is “to
apply money in the purchase of some property from which interest or
16.
Speight v. Gaunt, (1883) 22 Ch.D. 727 at 739–40; Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co. Ltd,
[1980] 1 All E.R. 139 at 150 (Eng.).
17.
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Trustees and Their Broader Community: Where Duty, Morality and Ethics Converge, 9 Trust Law International 71, 73 (1995).
18.
[1919] 2 Ch. 58 at 64–65 (Eng.). See also Re Somerset, [1894] 1 Ch. 231 at 247 (Eng.).
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profit is expected, and which property is purchased in order to be held for
the sake of the income which it will yield.”19 Watt defines investment in
terms similar in substance to those of P. O. Lawrence, J. with the distinction that he substituted the phrase “direct financial returns” for the word
“income” in the judicial definition.20 In the words of the learned author:
“An investment is something that is acquired in the expectation that it
will produce profit in the form of direct financial returns.”21 From the
above definitions, it can be said that whether or not the acquisition of an
asset or a product is an investment depends on the purpose of acquisition.
Thus, property which is acquired merely for use and enjoyment is not an
investment.22 For instance, the purchase of a car is an investment for a
cab operator, but not for a private owner who uses it merely for pleasure.
Perhaps, the “purpose of acquisition theory” will be better appreciated by
contrasting the following two English cases. In Re Wragg,23 the investment clause contained in the trust instrument was held to authorize the
purchase of real property for the sake of the income that it would yield.
By contrast, in Re Power’s Will Trusts,24 it was held that a power to
invest in the purchase of freehold property did not authorize the purchase
of freehold house with vacant possession for the beneficiaries to occupy.
Distinguishing the facts of Re Wragg, Jenkins, J., observed that “there is
a distinction between purchasing freehold property for the sake of the
income which will be obtained from it and purchasing freehold property
to occupy it.”25
Hanbury and Martin stated that “premium bonds and chattels, such as
antiques or silver, are not investments for this purpose.”26 This statement, however, seems to take no cognizance of the purpose of acquisition theory.27 For the acquisition of antiques and silver, it is respectfully
submitted, could be an investment in the hands of a curator or an antique
19.
A similar definition was furnished in the American case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Wickham DC, Minn. 12 F. Supp. 245, 247, in the following words: “An investment is the
placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to source income or profit from its
employment.”
20.
G. WATT, LAW OF TRUSTS 268 (Blackstone Press 3d ed. 2001).
21.
Id.
22.
Re Peczenik’s Settlement Trusts, [1964] 2 All E.R. 339 at 341 (Eng.).
23.
Re Wragg, [1919] 2 Ch. 58 (Eng.).
24.
Re Power’s Will Trusts, [1947] 2 All E.R. 282 (Eng.).
25.
Id. at 283.
26. J. E. MARTIN, MODERN EQUITY 540 (Sweet & Maxwell 17th ed. 2005). For a similar view,
see also J. G. RIDDALL, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 350 (Oxford Univ. Press 6th ed. 2002).
27.
Nor does it take account of the modern portfolio theory which, as we shall see shortly,
emphasizes the evaluation of the investment portfolio holistically rather than on an asset-by-asset
basis.
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dealer, though not so in the hands of a pastime collector. Whether such
an investment, if not otherwise prohibited, is a suitable trust investment
depends on the circumstances of the trust including its object and likely
duration.28 For instance, trustees of a museum may invest in famous antiques and curios knowing that a substantial collection of such will enhance patronage of the museum which, in turn, will have a direct impact
on its income. In The Modern Law of Trusts, authors Parker and Mellows
stated the position quite incisively in the following words: “Over the last
few years trustees have invested in works of art, antique furniture, silver,
silver bullion and oriental carpets. Almost invariably these are unsuitable
as investments unless the trustees have considerable freedom of choice as
to the time of disposal . . . .”29 Underhill and Hayton are even more
assertive in stating that “the purchase of a valuable painting or a rare
stamp or antique desk that the trustees believe to have a good chance of
capital appreciation will be an investment.”30
If anything is clear from the authorities, it is that to qualify as an investment, the asset or product must be acquired with a view to producing
direct financial returns to the trust estate. However, it does not seem as
yet settled the form which the direct financial returns should take, that
is, whether in the form of income or capital appreciation or both. This
question did not arise in Re Wragg where, at any rate, the investment in
issue was capable of producing both income and capital growth. It
would, accordingly, be naive to assume that by using the word “income”
the learned judge meant to exclude capital growth as a legitimate expectation of trust investment. Moreover, as a preface to his definition of the
term ‘investment’, P. O. Lawrence, J., had stated it “to include as one of
its meanings”31 the above-quoted words, thus admitting the possibility of
other meanings. Proceeding further in the same judgment, the learned
judge also stated that “in ordinary parlance real estate is spoken of as an
investment if bought in order to be held for the sake of the income or
profit 32 accruing from it.”33 Surely, the word “profit” denotes either or
both income and capital appreciation upon realization of the investment.
28.
Interestingly, an option to acquire or dispose of gold or silver is listed as an investment in
the Second Schedule to the Investments and Securities Act (2007).
29.
A. J. OAKLEY, THE MODERN LAW OF TRUSTS 678 (Sweet & Maxwell 9th ed. 2008).
30. UNDERHILL & HAYTON, LAW RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 738 (D. Hayton et al.
eds., LexisNexis Butterworths 17th ed. 2007). See also G. WATT, TRUSTS AND EQUITY, supra note 2,
at 413.
31.
Re Wragg, [1919] 2 Ch. 58 at 64–65; [1918-19] All E.R. Rep. 233 at 237 (Eng.).
32.
Italics supplied for emphasis.
33.
Re Wragg, [1919] 2 Ch. 58 at 64–65; [1918-19] All E.R. Rep. 233 at 237 (Eng.).
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Nevertheless, the orthodox English rule,34 which was imported into Nigeria,35 is that a trust investment must have the prospects of producing
income. The rationale for this rule is not difficult to comprehend when it
is recalled that historically the law of trusts developed largely in the context of family settlements where there were life tenants (sometimes concurrent or successive ones) and remaindermen, both of whom had
competing interests in income and capital. Thus, where there are such
competing interests, an investment that produces little or no income, but
only capital growth, will unduly favor the remaindermen at the expense
of the life tenants. Conversely, an investment that yields a high rate of
income because the capital is either wasting away or insecure would be
detrimental to the remaindermen. The courts are apt to strike down either
investment for not only being inequitable, but also a breach of the trustee’s duty to hold the scales evenly between the beneficiaries of income
and capital. For this reason, originally, trustee securities consisted of
fixed-interest bonds and gilt-edged securities, which have the dual benefits of both the yield of income and maintenance of capital value (at least
in nominal terms).
More often than not, investors in the real estate and capital markets earn
higher returns in the form of capital appreciation than income. This point
is particularly crucial in a period of high inflation (such as the present
situation in Nigeria) when the real value of income is substantially depreciated. In the modern investment practice, accordingly, the trend is to
have an investment portfolio that would produce an appropriate balance
between income and capital appreciation. It is no longer satisfactory, in
the light of modern economic realities and investment techniques, to define investment by reference to the prospects of income production simpliciter. The better view, therefore, seems to be as expressed by Megarry,
V-C, in Cowan v. Scargill,36 where he stated that the trustees’ investment
power “must be exercised so as to yield the best return for the beneficiaries, judged in relation to the risks of the investment in question and
34.
The English law seems to have been substantially altered, first, as a result of the modern
portfolio theory which has since been judicially endorsed there and, secondly, by virtue of the Trustee Act, 2000, which has practically done away with what was hitherto known as the “authorized
list” of trustee securities and now permitted trustees to invest as if they were absolute beneficial
owners of trust funds.
35.
Similarly in the United States, see S. E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent
is Modern Prudent Investor Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 881 (2010).
36.
[1985] Ch. 270 at 287. But see Harries v. Church Commissioners for England, [1993] 2 All
E.R. 300 at 304 (Opinion of Nicholls, V-C.) (regarding income production and capital growth as
alternative criteria for judging the success of a trust investment) (Eng.). See also Cook v. Medway
Housing Society, [1997] S.T.C. 90 at 98 (“[Investment is the] laying out of money in anticipation of
a profitable capital or income return.”).
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the prospects of the yield of income and capital appreciation, both have
to be considered in judging the return from the investment.” This statement appears to represent the current policy direction in England37 as
well as the philosophical underpinning of the United States Uniform Prudent Investor Act.38 Indeed, the Law Reform Commission for England
and Wales has recommended long-term reforms that would enable trustees to operate “total return” investment (e.g. ., investment that disregards
the distinction between income and capital).39 Likewise, the Nigerian
Law Reform Commission, in its draft Trustee Bill,40 has proposed the
following definition: “Investment includes but (sic) not limited to assets
from which a profit or income is expected.” In the search for an apposite
definition, perhaps it bears reward to consider the following proposition:
Investment means any property or product which is acquired in reasonable expectation of direct financial returns in the form of income or capital appreciation or both.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES GUIDING TRUST INVESTMENT
A. HIGHER STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED THAN
41
OF OTHER DUTIES

IN THE

DISCHARGE

Traditionally, the general standard of stewardship required of a trustee in
managing trust affairs is to exercise all such care and caution as an ordinary prudent man would exercise in managing similar affairs of his
own.42 In the exercise of his investment powers, however, a higher standard of care, skill and prudence is required of a trustee under the rules
developed by the courts of equity.
In selecting an investment, the very first thing that a trustee should consider is whether it falls within the classes of investments authorized by
the terms of the trust or the general law, for under the extant legislation
37.

See, e.g., LAW REFORM COMMISSION, LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER 175, CAPIINCOME IN TRUSTS: CLASSIFICATION AND APPORTIONMENT, para. 1.3 (2004); Trustee Act,
2000, Notes 22 and 23 of the Explanatory Notes (Eng.).
38.
Promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission in 1994, drawing upon the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE (1992).
39.
LAW REFORM COMMISSION, LAW COMMISSION REPORT 315, CAPITAL AND INCOME IN
TRUSTS: CLASSIFICATION AND APPORTIONMENT, para. 5.104 (2009).
40. NIGERIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE REFORM OF TRUSTEE INVESTMENT[ S] ACT 47–58 (2011).
41.
In England, section 1 of the Trustee Act, 2000 has established a well-defined statutory duty
of care applicable to trustees when performing their functions under the Act, drawing no distinction
between the performance of trustees’ investment duty and other duties.
42.
Speight v. Gaunt, (1883) 9 App. Cas. 1 at 19 (Eng.); Learoyd v. Whiteley, (1887) 12 App.
Cas. 727 at 733 (Eng.); Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. 9 Pick. 446, 461 (1830) (U.S.).
TAL AND
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and rules of equity applicable in Nigeria,43 a trustee does not have the
same latitude as an absolute owner investing his own funds.44 Thus, for
example, in this country, unless expressly authorized by the terms of the
trust, a trustee must not invest in the securities issued by a private company.45 But a prudent businessman may, and often would prefer to, invest in the shares of a private blue-chip company that offers both the
prospects of a higher return and opportunity of his participating in the
control of the business. Where, however, a trustee is authorized to invest
in a private company and he happens to acquire a controlling interest in
such a company, the ordinary prudent man standard entails that:
He does not . . . content himself with such information as to the
management of the company’s affairs as he is entitled to as a
shareholder, but ensures that he is represented on the board. He
may be prepared to run the business himself as managing director or, at least, to become a non-executive director while having
the business managed by someone else. Alternatively, he may
find someone who will act as his nominee on the board and
report to him from time to time as to the company’s affairs.46
In the English case of Re Lucking’s Will Trusts,47 the trust estate held
majority shares in a private company. The sole trustee, who was also one
of the beneficiaries of the trust, appointed his trusted friend as managing
director of the company, but he failed to supervise adequately the drawings of the managing director. As a result, the company and, by extension, the trust estate lost a substantial amount upon the managing
director’s bankruptcy. Cross, J., applying the ordinary prudent man test,
held that by failing to supervise adequately the managing director, the
43.
In England, the law has been altered by section 3 of the Trustee Act, 2000 which authorizes
a trustee to make any kind of investment that he could make if he were absolutely entitled to the trust
assets. The only type of investment that still requires express authorization by the trust instrument is
investment in interests in land other than mortgages, freeholds and leaseholds. Similarly, in the U.S.,
all categoric restrictions on types of trustee investments have been abolished by the Uniform Prudent
Investor Act, section 2(e) (1994), 7B U.L.A. 16 (Supp. 1995).
44.
For the statutory list of authorized trustee securities, see the Trustee Investments Act, Cap.
T22, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004 (Nigeria). See also Learoyd v. Whiteley, (1887)
12 App. Cas. 727 at 733 (including statements by Lord Watson on the prudent man rule as controlling the actions of a trustee generally, who added the following rider: “Yet he is not allowed the
same discretion in investing the moneys of the trust as if he were a person sui juris dealing with his
own estate.”) (Eng.).
45.
Fasel Services Ltd v. Nigerian Ports Authority, [2003] 8 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 821) 73, C.A.,
aff’d, [2009] 9 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 1146) 400, S.C.
46.
Re Lucking’s Will Trusts, [1967] 3 All E.R. 726 at 733 (Cross, J.) (Eng.).
47.
Id.
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trustee had failed in his duty to the trust estate, for which he was liable to
the other beneficiaries for the loss occasioned thereby.
Similarly, in Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co. Ltd,48 Brightman, J., in
holding that the bank had breached its trust by failing to supervise adequately the management of a private company in which the trust had a
99.8% shareholding, echoed the above-quoted prudential guidelines propounded by Cross, J. His lordship, however, cautioned that those guidelines should not be construed as imposing on trustees holding majority
shares in a company an inviolable obligation to have one of them or a
nominee on the board of the company. What is required is that a trustee
majority shareholder must take such steps as the circumstances of each
case may dictate to supervise adequately the running of the affairs of the
company.49 Even, as the facts of Re Lucking’s Will Trusts itself illustrate,
merely being nominally on the board of the company or obtaining relevant information will be fruitless if not used to protect the interests of the
beneficiaries. The trustee investor ought to take active interest in the
management of the company for, among ordinary prudent businessmen,
it is axiomatic that where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.
Moreover, a trustee investor is under a duty to examine information
likely to bear importantly on the value or security of an investment such
as audit reports or records of title. Thus, in the American case of Estate
of Collins,50 trustees who lent money on a junior mortgage on unimproved real estate, failed to obtain a surveyor’s valuation of the property
and accepted an unaudited financial report were held liable for the resulting loss. This duty has now been enacted by section 2(d) of the United
States Uniform Prudent Investor Act which reads: “A trustee shall make
a reasonable effort to verify facts relevant to the investment and management of trust assets.”
Furthermore, the risk potential of a particular type of investment may
make it an unauthorized trustee investment. Thus, a trustee is traditionally required to spurn any investment in wasting or hazardous assets or in
speculative ventures.51 By contrast, for an ambitious businessman deal48.
Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co. Ltd, [1980] 1 All E.R. 139 (Eng.).
49.
“Alternatives which spring to mind are the receipt of the copies of the agenda and minutes
of board meetings if regularly held, the receipt of monthly management accounts in the case of a
trading concern, or quarterly reports.” Id. at 151. See, e.g., Re Miller’s Trust Deed, (1978) 75 L.S.
Gaz. 454 (discussing one of the trustees was a member of a firm of accountants which acted as
auditors for the company).
50.
72 Cal. App. 3d 663, 139 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1977) (U.S.).
51.
Learoyd v. Whiteley, (1887) 12 App. Cas. 727 (Eng.); King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869)
(U.S.).
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ing with his own funds, he may adopt as a guiding principle “the higher
the risk, the higher the expected return on investment.” Indeed, Gary
Watt puts it more pithily thus: “If the motto of the private investor is
‘speculate to accumulate’, the motto of the trustee investor is ‘select to
protect.’ ”52 However, that does not mean that the trustee is bound to
avoid all risk and in effect act as an insurer of the trust fund. “The distinction is between a prudent degree of risk, on the one hand, and hazard
on the other.”53 Ordinarily, those investments which have low risk quotient are apt to produce lower income to the detriment of income beneficiaries. It is, therefore, advisable for a trustee to take a middle course
between the ultra-secure and ultra-hazardous investments because going
by either of the two extremes would render him vulnerable to attack by
one class of beneficiaries or the other.54
To sum up, a classic statement of the equity rule which was made by
Lindley, L.J., in Re Whiteley 55 is still as relevant in Nigeria today as it
was in England in 1886 when it was pronounced. There, the Lord Justice
stated thus:
Care must be taken not to lose sight of the fact that the business
of the trustee, and the business which the ordinary prudent man
is supposed to be conducting for himself, is the business of investing money for the benefit of persons who are to enjoy it at
some future time, and not for the sole benefit of the person entitled to the present income. The duty of a trustee is not to take
such care only as a prudent man would take if he had only himself to consider; the duty rather is to take such care as an ordinary prudent man would take if he were minded to make an
investment for the benefit of other people for whom he felt morally bound to provide.56
Whilst the ordinary prudent man test is the standard of care required of
trustees generally, the standard may be raised in the case of a paid pro52.
WATT, LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 20, at 283.
53.
Bartlett, 1 All E.R. 139 at 150 (Brightman, J.) (Eng.).
54.
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, supra note 17, at 76, however, cautions that these equitable
principles “are not to be read as inhibiting trustees from maintaining portfolios of investments which
contain a prudent and sensible mixture of low-risk and higher risk securities. They are not to be so
read, because they were not directed at a portfolio which is a balanced exercise in risk management.”
55.
(1886) 33 Ch. D. 347 at 355, C.A.; aff’d sub nom. Learoyd v. Whiteley, (1887) 12 App.
Cas. 727, H.L (Eng.). Arguably, the progenitor of this prudent man test of a trustee’s investment
strategy was the American, Putman, J., in Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. 9 Pick. 446, 461
(1830).
56.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol22/iss1/7

12

Chukwu: Underpinnings of Trust Investment Law

2017]

UNDERPINNINGS OF TRUST INVESTMENT LAW

85

fessional trustee. For “a paid trustee is expected to exercise a higher standard of diligence and knowledge than an unpaid trustee, and . . . a bank
which advertises itself in the public press as taking charge of administrations is under a special duty.”57 In principle, however, it appears that it is
the acclaimed professionalism of a trustee more than his remuneration
that provides the basis for raising the standard of care required of him.58
Clearly, it is the fact that a trustee is a professional who, in the ordinary
course of business, is paid for rendering similar services to his clients
that justifies his being remunerated for what is ordinarily a gratuitous
office under the Anglo-Nigerian law.59 Thus, in Bartlett v. Barclays
Bank Trust Co. Ltd, Brightman, J., again, had this to say:
I am of opinion that a higher duty of care is plainly due from
someone like a trust corporation which carries on a specialised
business of trust management. A trust corporation holds itself
out in its advertising literature as being above ordinary mortals.
With a specialist staff of trained trust officers and managers . . .
the trust corporation holds itself out, and rightly, as capable of
providing an expertise which it would be unrealistic to expect
and unjust to demand from the ordinary prudent man or woman
who accepts, probably unpaid and sometimes reluctantly from a
sense of family duty, the burdens of a trusteeship. . . . so I think
that a professional corporate trustee is liable for breach of trust
if loss is caused to the trust fund because it neglects to exercise
the special care and skill which it professes to have.60

57.
Re Waterman’s W.T., [1952] 2 All E.R. 1054 at 1055 (Harman, J.) (Eng.). See also Bray v.
Ford, [1896] A.C. 44 at 51; Steel v. Wellcome Custodian Trustees Ltd, [1988] 1 W.L.R. 167; Re
Cooper (No. 2) (1978) 90 D.L.R. 3d 715 (Eng.). Compare Jobson v. Palmer, [1893] 1 Ch. 71, where
Romer, J., did not consider remuneration in itself as a sufficient ground for raising the standard of
care.
58.
This underlying principle is now statutorily enacted in section 1 of the English Trustee Act,
2000 which, ex facie, takes no account of remuneration. However, according to Part V of the Act,
professional trustees are presumed to be entitled to remuneration, unless the trust instrument otherwise provides. See also note 13 of the Explanatory Notes which accompany the Act. In the U.S., a
corporate or professional trustee is held accountable under the “special investment skills standard”
and protection from liability depends upon the trustee’s ability to prove that he has met the elevated
Uniform Prudent Investor Act (s. 2(f)) standards. See K. ZIESENHEIM, GUIDELINES FOR ADVISORS ON
THE UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, available at http://www.thornburginvestments.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
59.
Whereas in England and Nigeria, the individual trustee receives no compensation for his
work, unless it is otherwise authorized by the trust instrument, the court or the beneficiaries, in the
U.S., he is generally entitled to compensation unless he agrees to forgo it.
60.
[1980] 1 All E.R. 139 at 152 (Eng.).
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It is worth reiterating, all the same, that the engagement into which corporate trustees, as all other trustees, enter is not one of insurance.
Again, it should be stressed that the ordinary prudent man test is an objective one and represents the irreducible minimum standard of care below which the conduct of any trustee must not fall. The subjective
characteristics of a trustee, that is, whether he is a professional or an
amateur, should be considered only in order to raise, but never to lower,
the bar. It is on this premise that the approach adopted by Maugham, J.,
(though not his ultimate decision) in the English case of Re Vickery 61 has
been trenchantly criticized.62 In that case, the learned judge applied a
subjective standard to an executor-trustee, who employed a solicitor to
wind up the estate, unaware of the fact that the solicitor had twice been
suspended from practice. True to form, the solicitor absconded with the
trust funds. The judge held that the trustee had not breached his duty of
care, taking into consideration the fact that he was “a missionary ignorant
of business affairs.”
Consistent with such reasoning, one learned writer has recommended a
subjective standard of care for unpaid amateur trustees.63 This approach,
it is submitted, goes against the grain of legislative64 and academic thinking not only in England, but also in other jurisdictions such as the United
States and Australia. As Professor Scott65 once said of the American law,
“The standard fixed for the conduct of trustees is an external or objective
standard. He must at his peril exercise the care and skill and caution that
a prudent man would exercise under the circumstances.” Remarkably,
the current standard of care set out in section 1 of the English Trustee
Act, 2000 and in section 2(a) of the United States Uniform Prudent Investor Act still prescribes an objective test. In the case of the former, a
trustee must exercise such care and skill as is reasonable in the circumstances, while the latter requires a trustee, in satisfying the standards of a
61.
[1931] 1 Ch. 572. Cf. Wohlleben v. Canada Permanent Trust Co. (1976) 70 D.L.R. 3d 257
at 275; Evans v. Westcombe, [1999] 2 All E.R. 777 at 787–88 (noting that, in relieving a trustee of
trust liability, she “was a lay person unaccustomed to problems of this nature who was at all times
willing to abide by the advice of solicitors.”) (Eng.).
62.
See WATT, LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 20, at 224–25 and other authorities cited therein.
Millett, L.J. (as he then was), however, disassociates himself from the criticisms in Armitage v.
Nurse, [1998] Ch. 241 at 252.
63.
D. R. Paling, The Trustee’s Duty of Skill and Care, 37 CONV. 48–59 (1973).
64.
See, e.g., Trustee Act, 2000, § 1, sch. 1, para. 1 (Eng.); UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT,
§ 2(a) (1994) (U.S.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE
§ 227 (2007) (U.S.); Trusts Act 1973 s 22(1) (Austl.).
65.
A. W. SCOTT, ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 435 (Little, Brown & Co. 1960). See
also where the distinguished author stated thus: “If [a trustee] is in a position to do better than the
ordinary man, it is not enough to do what the ordinary man would do.” Id. at 343.
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prudent investor, to exercise reasonable care, skill and caution. The better view, therefore, seems to be as expressed by Professor Watt who, in
analyzing the current English statutory provision, states as follows:
[T]he new duty of care resolves the uncertainties of the old
cases. There can now be no doubt that Re Vickery is bad law,
that trustees should never be judged according to their own subjective opinions as to what constitutes prudent behaviour. Having said that, the statutory ‘duty of care’, whilst objective, is
nevertheless one which is variable according to the subjective
characteristics of the trustee. Factors which might lead to a
stricter standard would include the trustee’s experience and expertise (professed or real).66
This proposition consorts with the qualifications contained in section
1(a) and (b) of the English Trustee Act, 2000 as well as in section 2(f) of
the Uniform Prudent Investor Act to the effect that a trustee who has
special skills or expertise, or is appointed a trustee in reliance upon his
representation that he has special skills or expertise, has to be judged by
a higher standard.67 Accordingly, since the standard of trustee prudence
is relational, it follows that professional trustees are to be judged by the
standard of prudent professionals; whereas amateurs will be judged by
the standard of prudent amateurs.
In the United States, the same standard of care and prudence as aforesaid
is also imposed on pension fund trustees.68 In Nigeria, it is instructive to
note that the statutory duty of care imposed by section 69(b) of the Pension Reform Act, 2014 on pension fund administrators and custodians
simply requires them to exercise reasonable care. However, being professional corporate trustees who by themselves canvass for their engagement, it is submitted that they are subject to a higher standard of skill and
caution than the ordinary prudent man under the equitable jurisprudence.
B. EVEN-HANDEDNESS

AS

BETWEEN

THE

BENEFICIARIES

In most cases, trusts are created for the benefit of present and future
beneficiaries. In such cases, there is usually a life tenant who is entitled
66.
WATT, LAW OF TRUSTS, supra note 20, at 225; see also WATT, TRUSTS AND EQUITY, supra
note 2, at 366–67; UNDERHILL & HAYTON, supra note 30, at 1124.
67.
See also Trusts Act 1973 s 22(1) (Austl.).
68.
See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a) (2008). Note that section 2(f) of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act applies to all
fiduciaries.
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to the income of the trust property and, upon his death, the capital would
pass to the remaindermen. Where there are such different classes of beneficiaries, the trustee is under a paramount duty to act impartially or
maintain an even hand as between the life tenant and remaindermen.69
The duty is by no means restricted to cases where there are successive
beneficiaries; it applies equally where the competing interests of the beneficiaries run concurrently.70 This principle of impartiality, which is an
offshoot of the duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries as a whole, is aimed at
ensuring that no beneficiary or class of beneficiaries gets an undue advantage or more than their fair share of the trust assets at the expense of
the others. However, as one learned commentator wittily observes,
“treating beneficiaries impartially is often a practical nightmare for trustees.”71 Be that as it may, it has also been noted that:
Impartial treatment does not mean equal treatment, but it is
problematic to pronounce other broad definitions of impartial
treatment. Rather, the requisites of impartiality are fact-based
and determined on a case-by-case basis. Consequently, a trustee
seldom can be assured in advance that a certain investment policy will in fact be considered impartial if any beneficiary
complains.72
The duty of impartiality has far-reaching implications on trustee investment, the key aspects of which need to be expounded.
1. Choice of Investment
Where the trustee has the discretion to select investments, he must exercise such discretion in a manner that is fair to all the beneficiaries. He
must, accordingly, select such an investment or (in line with the current
global best practice) investment portfolio as would produce reasonable
income for the life tenant as well as maintain the value of the capital for
69.
Re Tempest, (1866) L.R. 1 Ch. App. 485 at 487; Nestle v. National Westminster Bank Plc,
[1994] 1 All E.R. 118; Edge v. Pensions Ombudsman, [2000] Ch. 602. In the U.S., the trustee’s duty
of impartiality in the investment and management of trust assets has been codified by section 6 of
the Uniform Prudent Investor Act. In England, the Law Reform Commission Report 315 (May 7,
2009) on Capital and Income of Trusts: Classification and Apportionment, has proposed that there
should be imposed on trustees a new flexible statutory duty to balance the interests of income and
capital beneficiaries.
70.
Lloyds Bank Plc v. Duker, [1987] 3 All E.R. 193; X v. A, [2000] 1 All E.R. 490 (Eng.).
71.
S. A. Medlin, Limitations on the Trustee’s Power to Adjust, 42 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
717, 728 (2008).
72.
Id. at 723. See also Nestle v. National Westminster Bank Plc, [1988], unreported but transcribed in [1996] 10 (4) T.L.I. 112 at 115 (Eng.).
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the benefit of the remainderman.73 As Cotton, L.J., stated in Re Whiteley,74 “Trustees are bound to preserve the money for those entitled to the
corpus in remainder, and they are bound to invest it in such a way as will
produce a reasonable income for those enjoying the income for the present.” Thus, for example, in the English case of Raby v. Ridehalgh,75 it
was held that a trustee, in exercising his investment powers, ought not to
unduly favor the life tenant, even though the investment yielded a high
return. And, in the American case of Estate of Cooper,76 a trustee was
removed for excessively favoring income production over capital appreciation. Conversely, in the Canadian case of Re Smith,77 a trustee was
held to be under a duty to re-invest where authorized shares were producing low dividends because of the company’s policy to pursue capital
growth. Such an investment was unfair to the income beneficiary, but
favorable to the contingent beneficiary. The trustee was removed from
office for a breach of his duty to hold the scales evenly between the
beneficiaries.
An excellent illustration of how far the courts can go in enforcing this
duty of impartiality is afforded by the New Zealand case of Re Mulligan
(deceased).78 In that case, the testator died in 1949, leaving his widow a
substantial legacy and a life interest in a farm. The widow and a trust
corporation were appointed trustees of the estate. The trustees sold the
farm in 1965 and invested the proceeds in fixed-interest securities until
the widow died in 1990. The trust corporation had, between 1965 and
1990, tried to persuade the co-trustee/life tenant to invest in equities so as
to counter inflation, but she understandably demurred. Of course, the investment favored her at the expense of the contingent beneficiaries.
Upon the estate capital being substantially depreciated in value, the trust
corporation was held to be in breach of trust because it had become cognizant of the depreciatory effect of inflation on the capital and yet
pandered to the wishes of the life tenant.
Under the current global economic climate, the position of trustees vis-àvis the choice of investments is an unenviable one. Professor Pettit captures the quagmire in the following words:

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Nestle v. National Westminster Bank Plc, [1994] 1 All E.R. 118 (Eng.).
(1886) 33 Ch.D. 347 at 350 (Eng.).
(1855) 7 De. G.M. & G. 104; 44 E.R. 41 (Eng.).
913 P.2d 393 (1996) (U.S.).
(1971) 16 D.L.R. 3d 130; on appeal (1971) 18 D.L.R. 3d 405 (Can.).
[1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 481 (N.Z.).
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In the present investment situation, the position of trustees is not
easy. The sort of investment that will produce a high rate of
interest that will suit the life tenant is likely to be fixed-interest
investment, the real value of which may well be eroded by inflation by the time that the remaindermen come into possession,
while equities that it is hoped will show a capital appreciation
and thus safeguard the position of remaindermen may not produce a high enough rate of interest to satisfy the tenant for
life.79

Indeed, the dilemma of Nigerian investors is further accentuated by the
notorious fact that interest rates are currently at an abysmal trough while,
at the same time, there has been a cataclysmic crash in the stock market.
As at the time of writing, most equity investments in Nigeria could afford neither capital appreciation nor appreciable dividends, if any dividend at all. Thus, the investment climate is so fraught that any trustee
who assumes the uneasy task of making trust investments at the moment
may be tempted to say Jesus’ last prayer at Gethsemane before he was
given up to his murderers: “Lord, if it be possible, let this cup pass from
me.”80 And if he has successive beneficial interests to contend with, his
predicament is no less than that of a toad in the river; anyhow it opens its
mouth to cry, water must percolate into its alimentary canal!81
It may be added that where the settlor or testator has, whether expressly
or by necessary implication, evinced an intention to allow the trustee to
favour the life tenant (maybe his spouse or parent) over the remaindermen or vice versa, the trustee will not be held to be in breach of the duty
of impartiality if he takes that into consideration in choosing investments.82 Thus, in the American case of In re J. B. Uihlein Trust,83 the
trust investment portfolio consisted of 70% fixed-income securities and
30% equities. The court found as a fact that the settlor intended to allow
the trustee to favor the life beneficiaries over the remainder beneficiaries
and, accordingly, refused an application to review the investments.
79.
P. H. PETTIT, Equity and the Law of Trusts 423 (Oxford Univ. Press 11th ed. 2009). The
case of Re Mulligan (dec’d), id., amply illustrates this view.
80.
Matthew 26:39 (Revised Standard).
81.
In the U.S., such predicament has been removed for trustees by the Uniform Principal and
Income Act, section 104 of which permits a trustee to “adjust between principal and income to the
extent the trustee considers necessary if the trustee invests and manages trust assets as a prudent
investor.”
82.
Nestle v. National Westminster Bank Plc, 10 (4) T.L.I. at 115 (Hoffmann, J.); see also
McPhail v. Doulton, [1971] A.C. 424 at 451 (Eng.).
83.
417 N.W. 2d 908 (1987); 420 N.W. 2d 57 (1988) (U.S.).
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However, a more recent American case which, as has been noted,84
“leaves trustees in a quandary as to exactly when the rule of impartial
treatment of different classes of trust beneficiaries would be applicable”
is SunTrust Bank v. Merritt.85 In that case, a corporate co-trustee was
alleged to have breached its fiduciary duties (particularly the duty of impartiality) by favoring the income beneficiary over the remaindermen.
The income beneficiary, who was also a co-trustee, had persuaded the
trust corporation to pursue a policy of investing in low-risk, tax-free,
fixed-income securities. The court held that there was no breach of duty,
curiously construing the provision in the trust instrument that required
the trustees to distribute the “entire net income” to the life beneficiary as
favoring him and dispensing with the normal duty of impartiality.
Sure enough, this decision invites strictures. The direction to distribute
the “entire net income” to the life tenant, which is a prosaic phraseology
commonly found in trust instruments creating successive interests, cannot be seriously said to manifest a clear intention to favor the income
beneficiary at the expense of the remaindermen. On the contrary, the
trust instrument contained a highly restrictive principal-invasion provision, which was a pointer to the fact that the settlor was equally concerned about the quantum of benefits that would go to the remainder
beneficiaries. Thus, construing that phrase fairly and straightforwardly,
as an investment clause ought to be construed, it simply means that the
trustees were required to make such investments as were capable of producing fair income consistent with their normal duties of prudence and
impartiality, and then hand over whatever is the net income realized from
such investments to the income beneficiary. Indeed, the material facts of
this case appear to be on all fours with those of Re Mulligan,86 yet, as
witnessed above, the New Zealand High Court found a breach of trust
arising from a breach of the duty of impartiality on the part of the defendant co-trustee. Clearly, the decision in Re Mulligan is to be preferred.
2. Duty to Convert: Rule in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth
The rule in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth 87 is that, although no direction is
expressly or impliedly contained in the will, where there is a residuary
bequest of personal estate in a will for the benefit of persons in succes84.
M. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and Fiduciary Administration, 57 MERCER L.
REV. 403, 410 (2005).
85.
612 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. App. Ct. 2005) (U.S.).
86.
Re Mulligan, [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 481 (N.Z.).
87.
Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth, (1802) 7 Ves. 137; 32 E.R. 56; Hinves v. Hinves, (1884) 3
Hare 609 at 611 (Eng).
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sion, in the absence of a contrary intention, express or implied, there is a
duty upon the trustees to realize all such parts of the estate as are of a
wasting or hazardous character or of a reversionary nature, or are unauthorized by the general law or by the will, and invest or re-invest the
proceeds in some authorized and permanent investment. The rule is
aimed at maintaining a fair balance between the competing interests of
the life tenant and remainderman. Thus, if no conversion is done, income
accruing from wasting assets, such as a copyright, mine, ship, livestock
or the like, might be exhausted by the life tenant to the detriment of the
remainderman. Conversely, if reversionary interests (i.e., proprietary interests that will only come into possession after the death of the life tenant) and other non-income-producing property are left in their present
state, the life tenant may get nothing before he dies.
It has, however, been observed that the traditional reasoning behind the
rule is no longer appropriate to contemporary economic conditions.88
Whilst this view is partially justified in the light of the current global
economic distortions, such as spiraling inflation, stock market crash and
the latest phenomenon popularly referred to as ‘economic meltdown’, it
seems that the rule is still of contemporary relevance in addressing the
fundamental concerns that necessitated its formulation.89 The argument
in support of that view is predicated upon a comparative analysis of the
current safety of, and returns from, equity investments vis-à-vis fixedinterest (especially gilt-edged) investments.90 Standing alone, this argument seems quite compelling. However, it ignores the core issue, which
is the probability of either the life tenant exhausting the beneficial interests in wasting assets or the reversionary interests not falling into possession until the life tenant is dead. In either case, the intention of the
testator to benefit both beneficiaries would have been defeated. Clearly,
it cannot be gainsaid that either beneficiary would be better off getting
(metaphorically speaking) ‘half bread’, in the worst-case scenario, rather
than getting nothing at all, which result is guaranteed by the application
of the rule in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth.

88.
PETTIT, supra note 79, at 429.
89.
For the philosophical underpinnings of the rule, see A.K.P. KLUDZE, Modern Principles of
Equity 318 (Foris Publications 1988).
90. PETTIT, supra note 79, at 429.
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3. Duty to Apportion91
a. Rule in Re Earl of Chesterfield’s Trusts
As a corollary of the duty to convert, a trustee has a further duty to
apportion the proceeds of the sale or conversion as between income and
capital so that the former can be given to the life tenant while the latter
will be re-invested in the interest of the remainderman. For the trustee to
do an equitable apportionment, the rule in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth is
complemented by the rule in Re Earl of Chesterfield’s Trusts.92 The
formula prescribed by this latter rule is to ascertain the sum which, if
invested at the date of the testator’s death at four per cent per annum
compound interest, with yearly rests, and deducting income tax, would,
with the accumulation of interest, have produced, at the date of receipt,
the amount actually received; the sum so ascertained should be treated as
capital and the residue should be treated as income. Having done the
apportionment, the trustee has to pass on the net income that accrued
from the date of the testator’s death to the life tenant, unless a contrary
intention appears from the will, either expressly or by implication.
b. Other rules of apportionment of trust investment accruals and
liabilities
Where trust funds are invested in the shares of a company and the company declares dividends or makes special distributions to its shareholders, the courts of equity have laid down rules and legal scholars have
equally developed theories as to the mode of apportionment of the accruals to the trust estate between income and capital. Such distributions include bonus payments (whether in cash or in specie) out of the
company’s accumulated profits; distribution of shares payable from the
reserve fund or share premium account; distribution of shares upon a
demerger; and distribution of terminal benefits to shareholders upon
winding-up. So, too, have the courts fashioned rules for the apportionment of the liabilities of the trust estate, including investment costs and
charges. For want of space, it is considered unnecessary, for present pur91.
For statutory duty to apportion, see the English Apportionment Act, 1870, s. 2;
Apportionment Law, Cap. 7, Laws of Western Nigeria, 1959, s. 3; Apportionment Law, Cap. A9,
Laws of Lagos State, 2003, s. 3. In the U.S., the common law rules of apportionment have been
largely superseded by the Uniform Principal and Income Act, the provisions of which apply in the
absence of a contrary intention expressed by the settlor.
92.

(1883) 24 Ch. D. 643.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2017

21

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 22 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 7

94

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW[Vol. XXII

poses, to embark upon a detailed discussion of these rules and theories
which can be found in the standard works on trusts.93
C. NO

COMMINGLING OF TRUSTEE’S PERSONAL AND TRUST FUNDS IN

AN INVESTMENT

A trustee must not commingle trust fund with his own money in making
an investment, as the admixture of both funds ipso facto strikes at the
heart of his core obligation to keep the trust property segregated from his
personal patrimony. This is an off-shoot of “an inflexible rule of a court
of equity that a person in a fiduciary position . . . is not allowed to put
himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict.”94 Should such
a conflict arise, his duty must prevail over his interest. The rationale for
the rule is to protect the trustee from the fallibility of human nature. As
an American judge once noted, “there are canons of the court of equity
which have their foundation, not in the actual commission of fraud, but
in that hallowed orison, ‘lead us not into temptation.’ ”95 So also, in making an investment, a trustee must not, in general, combine trust funds
with the funds of another trust or of a third party.
If a trustee mixes trust funds with his own money in an investment which
results in a loss, the trustee, having committed a breach of trust, is liable
to make good the loss to the beneficiary.96 On the other hand, if such an
investment is profitable, he becomes a constructive trustee of a proportionate share of the profits attributable to the trust funds so invested.
According to Professor Kludze,97 “If a trustee employs trust funds in his
own trade or business, he becomes a constructive trustee of any profit
accruing therefrom, subject to all just allowances for his own time, energy and skill, and for the assets he has contributed.”98 He cites as an
authority for his proposition the English case of Re Jarvis.99 The learned
Professor’s formulation, however, does not seem to sit well with established principles. For that reason, it is considered necessary to probe into
the details of the case cited so as to assess its precedential value as an
authority for such a proposition.
93.
See, e.g., PETTIT, supra note 79, at 430–40; M. I. JEGEDE, LAW OF TRUSTS, BANKRUPTCY
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE 245–50 (MIJ Publishers 1999).
94.
Bray v. Ford, [1896] A.C. 44 at 51 (Lord Herschell); see also Regal (Hastings) Ltd v.
Gulliver, [1942] 1 All E.R. 378.
95.
Wormley v. Wormley, 21 U.S. 421, 424 (1823) (Johnson, J.).
96.
Thompson v. Finch, (1856) 22 Beav. 316 (Eng.).
97.
KLUDZE, supra note 89, at 337.
98.
Italics added to highlight the objectionable part of the proposition.
99.
[1958] 1 W.L.R. 815, reprinted in [1958] 2 All E.R. 336 (Eng.).
AND
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In Re Jarvis, a testator appointed his daughters, the plaintiff and the defendant, to be his executrices and trustees and gave them his business
without conferring power on them to carry on the business. Meanwhile,
the defendant had been running a similar business in a nearby shop for
many years. Upon the testator’s death, his business was found to be insolvent, the debts exceeding the assets by some £350. When the lease of
the business premises expired, the landlords sued the trustees and obtained judgment for possession and arrears of rent. The defendant personally paid the business debts and the rent arrears. Thereupon, she took
a new lease from the landlords and re-opened the shop which had been
closed down for four years since the premises were damaged by a bomb
a year before the testator’s death. She ran it as a joint business with her
original shop. As the resuscitated business flourished, her younger sister
and co-trustee (who had remained aloof all the while) brought an action
claiming that the defendant was accountable as a constructive trustee of
the new lease and for any profits made by her in carrying on the business. The defendant conceded that she was a constructive trustee of the
lease for herself and the plaintiff equally. The court entered judgment to
that effect and ordered an inquiry as to what rent, if any, ought to be paid
by the defendant in respect of her beneficial occupation of the business
premises.
As regards the business carried on in the premises, it was held that the
defendant was accountable for those benefits which came to her because
of her position as a trustee of the testator’s estate. After holding that that
leg of the plaintiff’s claim was defeated by laches, the court still went
ahead to consider the proper method of assessing the accountability. The
defendant’s counsel submitted that only those assets of the estate or benefits which had been proved to have flowed to the defendant by reason of
her position as a trustee ought to be taken into account. On the other
hand, the plaintiff’s counsel submitted that that would be an impossible
inquiry and that the defendant should be made accountable for the whole
business and its profits, making allowances for the time, energy and skill
that she had expended, the assets she had brought in, the testator’s debts
she had paid, etc. In accepting the submission of the plaintiff’s counsel in
preference to that of the defendant’s counsel, Upjohn, J., had this to say:
I do not think that it is possible to lay down any general rule in
relation to businesses beyond the general principle already
stated, that a trustee may not make a profit out of his trust. To
take an example: suppose that the defendant, by virtue of her
position as trustee, had been able to influence (as possibly she
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did) increased supply to the shop at No. 230, Trafalgar Road
[her own shop], without re-opening No. 7, Woolwich Road [the
testator’s shop], she would clearly be accountable, though
surely she should be accountable rather on the basis submitted
by counsel for the defendant than on that submitted by counsel
for the plaintiff. Each case must depend on its own facts, and
the form of inquiry which ought to be directed must vary according to the circumstances. In this case where the defendant
reincarnated the testator’s own business on the same premises
as formerly and obtained supplies, so far as she was able, from
the suppliers of the former business,100 I think that the proposition propounded by counsel for the plaintiff is correct . . . .101

From the facts of the case and the decision reached, firstly, it is clear that
the learned judge did not purport to lay down any general principle; the
case was decided on its peculiar facts. Here, the trustee’s conduct was in
no way morally reprehensible. In fact, the trust property for which she
was held accountable had practically ceased to exist by the time she assumed the office of a trustee. She only managed to recreate it using her
own resources, time, energy and skill, which she was neither obliged nor
empowered to do under the terms of the trust. Had she not done so, there
would have been no trust assets, but rather trust liabilities to contend
with. Secondly, it is obvious that the learned judge, standing, as it were,
by the strict canons of equity, regarded her as running the “reincarnated”
business of the testator for and on behalf of the trust estate. Hence, she
was accountable to the trust estate for the entire business proceeds, but it
was only fair that she be compensated for what she brought into the business, i.e., her time, energy, skill and resources. As the court reasoned, the
decision would have been different had she been running her own business in her premises and in so doing converted trust property, e.g., the
testator’s business goodwill. In that case, the trust estate would have
been entitled to recover the value of the converted trust property plus a
proportionate share of the profits, and there would have been no question
of making any allowances for the trustee beyond her own fair share of
the business profits. It is to be noticed that this was a more advantageous
option for the defendant, as evident in her counsel’s submission which
was structured upon the exploded notion that the business was hers.102
100.
Italics supplied for emphasis.
101.
Re Jarvis, [1958] 2 All E.R. 336 at 340–41 (Eng.)
102.
In Phipps v. Boardman, [1965] 1 All E.R. 849 at 865, upon analogous facts, Russell, L.J.,
lamented thus: “I would like to say that the defendants have my sympathy, in that having laboured
and taken risks they are disappointed of their profit by principles of equity whose rigidity is necessary if cases deserving of no sympathy are not to escape.”
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Clearly, the principle that emerges from the decision in Re Jarvis is that
a distinction should be drawn between a trustee carrying on the business
of the trust and in so doing mixing his own property, on the one hand,
and carrying on the trustee’s own business and in so doing mixing trust
property, on the other. It seems that the principle which Professor Kludze
seeks to extract from that case applies rather to the former situation and
does not, contrary to the learned author’s proposition, apply to the latter.
Thus, in the former case, the trustee has to account to the trust estate for
the whole business and its profits, subject to all just allowances for her
inputs. Even for such a case, however, it is submitted that, since the office of a trustee is ordinarily a gratuitous one under the Anglo-Nigerian
law, the court should not make allowances for the trustee’s time, energy
and skill as a matter of course.103 It could do so only where the trustee is
otherwise entitled to remuneration or the court considers such a course
equitable having regard to the onerous nature of the business and the fact
that the trustee acted in good faith,104 as in the case under analysis.
As for the latter instance, where the trustee carries on his own business
and in so doing mixes trust funds with his own, the beneficiary is entitled
to recover the trust funds plus a prorated share of any profits made by the
trustee, without any question of making allowances for the trustee’s time,
energy and skill, which he would have expended anyway even if he had
not commingled the trust funds. In any case, whether the venture is profitable or not, the beneficiary may choose to demand the return of the trust
funds with interest.105 So, the beneficiary has a lien on the property acquired with the mixed funds for his claims against the trustee or his successor in title.
A celebrated case in which the applicable principles were elucidated by
the English House of Lords was Foskett v. McKeown.106 In that case, a
trustee used his own money to pay the first three premiums on a life
assurance policy and trust funds to pay the fourth and fifth premiums.
Upon his death, it was held by a majority of the House of Lords that the
trust beneficiaries were entitled to a 40% share in the proceeds of the
policy. Lord Millett stated the principles as follows:
103.
Williams v. Barton, [1927] 2 Ch. 9 at 11; Foster v. Spencer, [1996] 2 All E.R. 672 at 678
(Eng.).
104.
Phipps v. Boardman, [1965] 1 All E.R. 849 (Eng.); Re Duke of Norfolk’s Settlement
Trusts, [1978] 3 All E.R. 907 (Eng.).
105.
Heathcote v. Hulme, (1819) 1 Jac. & W. 122; Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2), [1975] Q.B.
373 at 397 (Eng.).
106.
[2001] 1 A.C. 102 (Eng.).
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Where a trustee wrongfully uses trust money to provide part of
the cost of acquiring an asset, the beneficiary is entitled at his
option either to claim a proportionate share of the asset 107 or to
enforce a lien upon it to secure his personal claim against the
trustee for the amount of the misapplied money. It does not matter whether the trustee mixed the trust money with his own in a
single fund before using it to acquire the asset, or made separate
payments (whether simultaneously or sequentially) out of the
differently owned funds to acquire a single asset . . . . As against
the wrongdoer and his successors, the beneficiary is entitled to
locate his contribution in any part of the mixture and to
subordinate their claims to share in the mixture until his own
contribution has been satisfied. This has the effect of giving the
beneficiary a lien for his contribution if the mixture is
deficient.108

This case falls under the second category above, that is, where the trustee
commingled trust funds in what was clearly his own personal investment.
Consistent with principle, the Law Lords simply held that the beneficiary
was entitled to claim “a proportionate share of the asset” (i.e., 40% of the
insurance proceeds), without adding any rider whatsoever to that declaration of the beneficiary’s right. That appears to be the correct position
under the Anglo-Nigerian as well as the American laws. Indeed, long
before now, Professor Scott – that oracle of the American law of trusts –
had stated the principle in the following terms: “Where a trustee uses
trust funds in his own business, he is chargeable with principal and interest or with a pro rata share of the profits of the business, at the option of
the beneficiaries.”109
D. INVESTMENT DECISIONS NOT
CONSIDERATIONS

TO

BE GUIDED

BY

NON-FINANCIAL

As a general rule, a trustee must not fetter his investment discretion for
reasons extraneous to the trust purposes, such as reasons of social, political, ideological or moral nature. His paramount duty is to exercise his
powers in the best interests of the present and future beneficiaries. Accordingly, where the purpose of the trust is to provide financial benefits
for the beneficiaries, as is the case in most private trusts, the prospects of
direct financial returns must preponderate over any other consideration in
107.
108.
109.

Italics supplied for emphasis.
Foskett v. McKeown, [2001] 1 A.C. 102 at 131.
SCOTT, supra note 65, at 332.
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taking investment decisions. These principles have been settled, at least,
since the decision in the English case of Cowan v. Scargill,110 if not
beyond. Thus, it is respectfully submitted that Banire’s proposition that it
is proper that “trustees take into account considerations that are not completely financial, such as political or ethical benefits from the investments”111 does not represent the actual state of the Anglo-Nigerian law.
Indeed, the two English authorities cited in support of the learned
writer’s proposition clearly demonstrate that what he propounded as a
general rule is rather an exception – a very constricted and rare exception
– to the rule. Interestingly, in neither of those two cases was the course
that he suggested approved by the court rather, as will be seen presently,
the rationes decidendi of both cases starkly contradict his proposition.
In Cowan v. Scargill, one half of the management committee of the National Coal Board’s pension fund trust sued the other half, which comprised Mr. Arthur Scargill and four other officials of the National Union
of Mineworkers (NUM). The complaint was that the NUM trustees had
refused to concur to the investment of the pension funds in certain overseas industries. The NUM trustees’ refusal was based on the fact that the
overseas industries were competitors of the British coal mining industry.
They argued that their opposition to the proposed investment was in the
best interests of the beneficiaries, who were retired British mineworkers.
In holding that the NUM trustees were in breach of trust by refusing to
invest in the overseas industries, Megarry, V-C, stated as follows:
In considering what investments to make trustees must put on
one side their own personal interests and views. Trustees may
have strongly held social or political views. They may be firmly
opposed to any investment in South Africa or other countries, or
they may object to any form of investment in companies concerned with alcohol, tobacco, armaments or many other things.
In the conduct of their own affairs, of course, they are free to
abstain from making any such investments. Yet if under a trust
investments of this type would be more beneficial to the beneficiaries than other investments, the trustees must not refrain from
making the investments by reason of the views that they
hold.112
110.
Cowan v. Scargill, [1984] 2 All E.R. 750; see also Buttle v. Saunders, [1950] 2 All E.R.
193 (Eng.).
111.
M. BANIRE, THE NIGERIAN LAW OF TRUSTS, 284 (Excel Publications 2002) (citing Cowan
v. Scargill, [1984] 2 All E.R. 750); Harris v. Church Commissioners, [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1241, reprinted in [1993] 2 All E.R. 300.
112.
Cowan v. Scargill, [1984] 2 All E.R. 750 at 761.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2017

27

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 22 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 7

100

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW[Vol. XXII

Having stated the basic principle, however, the learned judge acknowledged that there are exceptional circumstances in which arrangements
which work to the financial disadvantage of the beneficiary may yet be
for his benefit. In his words:
[I]f the only actual or potential beneficiaries of a trust are all
adults with very strict views on moral and social matters, condemning all forms of alcohol, tobacco and popular entertainments, as well as armaments, I can well understand that it might
not be for the ‘benefit’ of such beneficiaries to know that they
are obtaining rather larger financial returns under the trust by
reason of investments in those activities than they would have
received if the trustees had invested funds in other investments.
The beneficiaries might well consider that it was far better to
receive less than to receive more from what they consider to be
evil and tainted sources . . . .113
Interestingly, what Megarry, V-C, merely cited as a possibility became a
live issue a few years later in the Scottish case of Martin v. City of Edinburgh District Council,114 pertaining to the investment of public and
charitable funds. There, Lord Murray, applying the principle of Cowan v.
Scargill,115 held that the defendant had acted in breach of trust in pursuing an ethical policy of disinvesting from South Africa without considering expressly whether it was in the best interests of the beneficiaries and
without obtaining professional advice on the matter.
In both cases, clearly, the provision of financial benefits to the beneficiaries was the purpose of the trusts; hence the trustees’ investment decisions were required to be guided exclusively by financial considerations,
disregarding ideological considerations. But there are cases, especially
concerning charities, where a trust is set up to achieve a purpose other
than the provision of direct financial benefits to the beneficiaries. In such
cases, the trustees ought not to lose sight of the primary objects of the
trusts and invest in a manner incompatible therewith. Classic examples
are a trust for the advancement of the Jewish or Islamic religion investing
113.
Id. at 761–62. In such a situation, the trustees contemplating such ethical investment policy
must first present it to the beneficiaries and obtain their consent so that the investment will not be in
breach of trust.
114.
[1988] S.L.T. 329. Investment in companies that had substantial South African interests
was also objected to on ethical grounds in Harries v. Church Commissioners for England, [1993] 2
All E.R. 300. Those cases were decided in the heydays of the now defunct apartheid regime in South
Africa, which was globally condemned.
115.
[1984] 2 All ER 750.
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in a pig farm; a cancer research trust investing in a tobacco company and
a temperance charity investing in a brewery or distillery. In all of these
examples, what is paramount is the advancement of the charitable objects
of the trusts rather than any financial benefits to individuals. Accordingly, it is permissible for the trustees to exclude ethically unsound,
though financially rewarding, investments that will conflict with the very
objects of their charitable trusts.116
Nevertheless, apart from the exceptional cases, which are bound to be
rare, the same basic principle that trustees’ investment decisions must not
be dictated by extraneous non-financial considerations applies with equal
force to charity trustees.117 Thus, in the English case of Harries v.
Church Commissioners for England,118 the plaintiff, who was the
Anglican Bishop of Oxford, and the defendants were trustees of charitable trusts with multifarious purposes geared towards the promotion of the
Christian faith through the established Church of England. The plaintiff
sought a declaration to the effect that the trustees were under a duty to
invest in a manner compatible with Christian morality even if it involved
a risk of significant financial detriment. The declaration was refused,
Nicholls, V-C, holding that charity trustees were required to invest assets
held for the purpose of generating money with a view to securing the
maximum financial return compatible with ordinary prudence. They
could take ethical considerations into account only insofar as they could
do so without jeopardizing the profitability of investments.
Referring to Cowan v. Scargill,119 Nicholls, V-C, whilst drawing the factual distinction that that case had to do with trusts for the provision of
financial benefits to the beneficiaries, whereas the case before him was
concerned with charitable trusts whose purposes were multifarious, nevertheless, applied the same basic principle as stated in Cowan v. Scargill.
By expressly finding that the purposes of the trusts in Harries case were
“multifarious”, the court took the case out of the class of charities devoted exclusively to purposes other than the provision of financial benefits to the beneficiaries, in which cases the basic rule might be relaxed.
Besides, this was not one of those rare cases recognized by Megarry, VC, in Cowan v. Scargill as an exception where non-financial considerations could influence the trustees’ investment policy, i.e., if the actual or
potential beneficiaries are all adults who share the same strict views on
116.
117.
Nobles,
118.
119.

Harries v. Church Commissioners for England, [1993] 2 All E.R. 300 at 304.
Id.; see P. Luxton, Ethical Investment in Hard Times, 55 M.L.R. 587–93 (1992). Contra R.
Charities and Ethical Investment, 56 CONV. 115–18 (1992).
[1993] 2 All E.R. 300 (Eng.).
[1984] 2 All E.R. 750 (Eng.).
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moral and social matters. In this regard, Nicholls, V-C, observed that
“different minds within the Church of England, applying the highest
moral standards, will reach different conclusions” as to the merits of a
particular investment.120 Further, the facts of Harries case did not fit into
the other exception that Nicholls, V-C, himself formulated, which is that
where it is shown that potential donors to, or beneficiaries of, the charitable trust fund would be discouraged from making or accepting donations
if a particular type of investment is made, the trustees need to weigh the
ethical considerations against the potential financial benefits of such an
investment.121 Even, this exception has been faulted on the ground that
“If trustees are to be permitted to take such [donor] pressures into account . . . the door is opened to an unacceptable degree of donor control.
Uncurbed, this has the potential to reduce charities to the status of investment captives.”122
The decision in Harries case has come under a scathing criticism by a
learned commentator123 who argues that if charity trustees can give
money away in pursuit of their charity’s purposes, there is no justification for denying them the power, in making their investment policies, to
take into account some non-financial considerations that are consistent
with those purposes. According to him, “charity would, in most people’s
opinion, represent one area of social life in which the pursuit of values
other than profit or consumer satisfaction must dominate.”124 It is, however, submitted that the learned writer’s stricture is misconceived for the
reason that the purposes of the trusts in Harries case were not entirely
free from the provision of financial benefits. They were “multifarious”,
including the generation of funds for paying the stipends and pensions of
the clergy and their families.125 Viewed from that angle, the learned
judge seems justified in holding that the trustees were required to invest
120.
Harries v. Church Commissioners for England, [1993] 2 All E.R. 300 at 309. As Lord
Nicholls extra-judicially opined, “on moral issues on which there is no consensus, it is no part of the
function of a trustee to reject one view and prefer another, whether his own or that of some of the
beneficiaries, when to do so would be contrary to the financial interests of the beneficiaries.” Lord
Nicholls of Birkenhead, supra note 17, at 73–74.
121.
Id. at 304–05. See also where Nicholls, V-C, stated: “There is no evidence before me to
suggest that any such circumstance exists here.” Id. at 308.
122.
Luxton, supra note 117, at 590.
123.
Nobles, supra note 117.
124.
Id. at 115.
125.
This point of convergence between the trusts in Harries and Cowan cases is ably recognized by Luxton, supra note 117, at 593. Oddly enough, Nobles fails to see this fact as a justification
for Nicholls, V-C’s decision even though he has no difficulty in accepting Megarry, V-C’s decision
in Cowan on the basis that “The ordinary business of a pension scheme is to provide financial
benefits to individuals and . . . the best way to achieve this is to have the largest possible fund.”
Nobles, supra note 117, at 117.
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assets held for the purpose of generating money for, at least, the discharge of that key obligation (which had proved increasingly burdensome) with a view to securing the maximum financial return compatible
with ordinary prudence.
It is apparent from the foregoing analysis that English courts have been
consistent in insisting that, in the absence of an express authorization by
the trust instrument or all the beneficiaries, being sui juris and acting in
unison, trustees’ investment policies must not be dictated by ethical or
non-financial considerations especially where the investment objective is
or includes the generation of funds for the fulfilment of the financial
purposes of the trust. No doubt, this approach is to be followed in Nigeria, although there appears to be yet no reported judicial decision directly
in point. As Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead126 once suggested, “if social
conditions today are thought by some to dictate a need for a change in
the law, the change ought to be made by the legislature.” A few years
after the publication of the article containing that suggestion, the English
Trustee Act, 2000 was enacted which, however, made no express provision for ethical or social investment. Perhaps to make up for that omission, the Explanatory Notes (note 23) accompanying the Act states that
suitability (which is one of the twin standard investment criteria under
the Act) “will . . . include any relevant ethical considerations as to the
kind of investments which it is appropriate for the trust to make.” Although the so-called Explanatory Notes do not form part of the Act, they
are at least indicative of the current policy direction, which is that English trustees are now expected to show explicitly that they have considered the relevance or otherwise of ethical considerations in making their
investment decisions. That is already a statutory imperative for their pension fund counterparts who are now required to disclose the extent to
which social, environmental or ethical considerations are taken into account in the selection, retention and realization of investments.127
In the United States, the position used to be that trustees generally were
permitted to refrain from investing in companies “whose activities or
some of them are contrary to fundamental and generally accepted ethical
principles. They may consider such matters as pollution, race discrimination, fair employment and consumer responsibility.”128 However, in this,
as in many other respects, the American position has been significantly
126.
Lord Nicholls, supra note 17, at 74.
127.
Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment and Assignment, Forfeiture, Bankruptcy, etc.)
Amendment Regulations, 1999, S.I. 1999, No. 1849 (U.K.).
128. A. W. SCOTT & W. F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS vol. III, para. 227.17 (Little Brown &
Co 4th ed. 1988), quoted in Luxton, supra note 117m, at 591.
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altered by the Uniform Prudent Investor Act. Section 5 of the Act stipulates that “A trustee shall invest and manage the trust assets solely in the
interest of the beneficiaries.” This means that where the interest of the
beneficiaries consists in financial benefits, as is not infrequently the case,
no form of ethical or social investment policy is consistent with the duty
of loyalty if it entails sacrificing this overriding interest.129 Indeed, it is
remarkable that of all the eight factors that section 2(c) of the Act requires trustees to take into account in their investment decisions, none
seems to accommodate ethical or social considerations.
Finally, as on most issues concerning trust administration, in determining
the question whether ethical investments should be allowed in any particular case, the express provisions of the trust instrument will always have
an overriding effect. Thus, where the trust instrument prohibits or restricts certain types of investment, or authorizes trustees to make specified investments or to take into account non-financial considerations in
making their investment decisions, the trustees have no choice but to
abide by those directions.130
E. NEED

TO

CONSIDER SUITABILITY

AND

DIVERSITY

OF

INVESTMENTS

In England, suitability and diversity of investments have since been stipulated as the “standard investment criteria”, which a trustee must have
due regard to in exercising any power of investment.131 Likewise, in the
United States, diversification has been statutorily endorsed as one of the
fundamental elements of prudent investing,132 and among the factors that
trustee investors have to consider is “the role that each investment or
course of action plays within the overall portfolio.”133 In Nigeria, perhaps the closest approach to that is the provision in section 2(3) of the
Trustee Investments Act, which imposes a cap on the proportion of the
trust funds investible in any of the authorized classes of investment.134
The essence of such a provision, of course, is to ensure diversification of
trust investments. Although there is in Nigeria no equivalent statutory
prescription of such standard investment criteria, nevertheless, they flow
129.
Cf. Lord Nicholls, supra note 17, at 74.
130.
Harries v. Church Commissioners for England, [1993] 2 All E.R. 300 at 305 (Eng.).
131.
Trustee Act, 2000, § 4(1) (re-enacting Trustee Investments Act, 1961, § 6(1)) (Eng.). See
also Pensions Act, 1995, § 36(1) (U.K.).
132. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3 (1994) (U.S); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF
TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227(b) (2007) (U.S.).
133.
UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(c)(4) (1994) (U.S.). See also Trusts Act 1973 s 24(1)(b)
(Austl.).
134.
Similarly, see the Regulation on Investment of Pension Fund Assets, 2012 made under the
Pension Reform Act, 2004, available at www.pencom.gov.ng (last visited July 20, 2016).
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from the general standard of care required of trustees under the received
English principles of equity, which is “to take such care as an ordinary
prudent man would take if he were minded to make an investment for the
benefit of other people for whom he felt morally bound to provide.”135
Typically, such a prudent man of business will be loath to carry all his
eggs in one basket.136 He is apt to spread out his risks in a diverse range
of investments, depending on the size of his investible funds and the
needs of his intended beneficiaries.
Indeed, suitability and diversity of investments have a significant correlation with other basic principles guiding the exercise of trustee investment
discretions such as the need to produce a fair balance between income
flow and capital appreciation; the need for the maintenance or advancement of any infant or contingent beneficiaries and ethical considerations,
if the circumstances of the trust so warrant. Proper consideration of the
suitability of investments, therefore, entails that the trustee should, in an
appropriate case, take into account the competing interests of the life
tenant and the remaindermen as well as, perhaps, the personal circumstances of individual beneficiaries.137 He should also consider the nature
and value of the trust assets, the likely life span of the trust, the marketability of the investments and the amount and timing of the distribution
requirements. In the case of a charitable trust, it behoves the trustees to
consider whether or not a proposed investment is suitable to the trust,
having regard to its primary object.138 For instance, from an ethical viewpoint, the acquisition of shares of a tobacco company is clearly not a
suitable investment for a cancer research trust.
As for diversity of investments, whilst it is of crucial importance, it has
been observed that “the degree of diversification that is practicable and
desirable for a large fund may plainly be impracticable or undesirable (or
both) in the case of a small fund.”139 The perceptiveness of this observation becomes apparent when account is taken of the human resources and
transaction costs involved in multiple investments. Nevertheless, even
135.
Re Whiteley, (1886) 33 Ch. D. 347 at 355 (Lindley, L.J) (Eng.).
136.
Contrast with the opinion attributed to one acclaimed industrialist, Andrew Carnegie: “Put
your eggs in one basket. And watch the basket. That’s the way to make money.” WATT, TRUSTS AND
EQUITY, supra note 2, at 417.
137.
Such as the taxation position of the beneficiaries and the relative financial positions of the
life tenant and the remainderman. See Nestle v. National Westminster Bank Plc, [1994] 1 All E.R.
118 at 137.
138.
Harries v. Church Commissioners for England, [1993] 2 All E.R. 300 at 304.
139.
Cowan v. Scargill, [1984] 2 All E.R. 750 at 762 (Megarry, V-C) (Eng.). See also the
dictum of the same judge in Trustees of British Museum v. A-G, [1984] 1 All E.R. 337 at 343. See
also In re Dickinson, Appellant, 152 Mass. 184, 25 N.E. 99 (1890).
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for a small fund, diversification can still be cost-effectively achieved by
investing in collective investment schemes such as unit trusts or real estate investment trusts, where permissible.
F. NEED TO ENGAGE
AGENTS140

THE

SERVICES

OF

PROFESSIONALS

AND

As earlier stated, the trustee’s general duty of care requires him to conduct the business of the trust in the same manner in which an ordinary
prudent man would conduct his own business. Accordingly, where a prudent businessman would, in the ordinary course of business, engage the
services of, or take professional advice from, an expert, the trustee is
required to act likewise. The quintessential trustee is expected to be
neither a jack of all trades nor a master of all professions. Thus, even in
the absence of an express authorization by the trust instrument, a trustee
is entitled to engage skilled agents, at the cost of the trust estate, to act
for or advise him whenever there is any legal or moral necessity to do
so.141 For instance, whenever investing in real property or faced with
litigation, the trustee, unless he is a solicitor-trustee, must of necessity
engage a solicitor to offer legal advice, to do conveyancing or to handle
the litigation.
Indeed, the ancient wisdom of equity judges has been enacted by statutes. Thus, in England, trustees have been statutorily142 obligated to obtain and consider proper advice from a person whom they reasonably
believe is an expert in financial matters both in the exercise of their investment powers and in the conduct of periodic reviews of their investments. Previous English legislation, including the Trustee Act, 1893143
(which is still of contemporary relevance in Nigeria), required a trustee
lending money on the security of a mortgage to engage a competent estate surveyor to value the property. Furthermore, section 17 of the Trustee Act, 1893 authorized a trustee to appoint bankers and solicitors as
140.
See generally G. H. Jones, Delegation by Trustee: A Reappraisal, 22 M.L.R. 381–95
(1959); J. H. Langbein, Reversing the Non-Delegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law, 59 MO. L.
REV. 105 (1994); Sterk, supra note 35, at 897–904.
141.
Ex p. Belchier, (1754) 27 E.R. 144; Speight v. Gaunt, (1883) 22 Ch. D. 727. In England,
the requirement of “legal or moral necessity” had been discarded with the enactment of the Trustee
Act, 1925, s. 23 (1) which, however, has been repealed by the Trustee Act 2000, though the point
remains valid. See MARTIN, supra note 26, at 583; Jones, supra note 140, at 393; Re Vickery, [1931]
1 Ch. 572 at 581.
142.
Trustee Act, 2000, § 5 (re-enacting Trustee Investments Act, 1961, § 6(1)) (Eng.). It should
be noted that the wording of the statutory provisions is “obtain and consider”, which means that
trustees are not obliged to follow expert advice. See also Trusts Act 1973 s 24(2) (Austl.).
143.
Trustee Act, 1893, § 8 (Eng.).
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agents to receive and give valid discharge for any money or property
receivable on behalf of the trust estate. And, in Nigeria, a trustee has
been statutorily empowered to appoint a person whom he reasonably believes to be competent to value the trust fund, and the valuer’s assessment is conclusive as to the value of the trust fund on the date of the
valuation.144
Acting within his lawful authority, therefore, a trustee will not be liable
for any accidental loss or depreciation of the trust fund or property occurring in the hands of an agent to whom it has been properly entrusted in
the ordinary course of business.145 He may, however, be liable if he
leaves the trust fund or property in the hands of the agent for an unreasonable period and a loss is thereby occasioned.146 Besides, a trustee
must exercise reasonable care in selecting a skilled agent to act for the
trust;147 he must employ the agent in his proper field of expertise within
the scope of his usual business,148 and adequately supervise the activities
of the agent.149
Moreover, the rule of received English law which forbids a trustee from
delegating his investment discretions unless permitted by the trust instrument150 is still very much potent in Nigeria, although it has been whittled
down in England,151 and practically abrogated in the United States152 and
Australia.153 In those jurisdictions, trustees who properly delegate in accordance with the statutory authority are not personally liable for the
decisions or actions of the delegate.154 In Nigeria, a distinction still needs
144.
Trustee Investments Act, § 2(4)(c) (Nigeria); Trustee Law Cap. 125, Laws of Western Region of Nigeria 1959, § 14(3) (Nigeria).
145.
Speight v. Gaunt, (1883) 22 Ch. D. 727, CA; aff’d, 9 App. Cas. 1, H.L (Eng.).
146.
Trustee Act, 1893, § 17(3). See also Mathew v. Brise, (1845) 15 L.J. Ch. 39; Rowland v.
Witherden, (1851) 3 Mac. & G. 568; 21 L.J. Ch. 480 (Eng.).
147.
Re Weall, (1889) 42 Ch. D. 674; Robinson v. Harkin, [1896] 2 Ch. 415 (Eng.).
148.
Rowland v. Witherden, (1851) 3 Mac. & G. 568; Fry v. Tapson, (1884) 28 Ch. D. 268
(Eng.).
149.
Mathew v. Brise, (1845) 15 L.J. Ch. 39; Re Lucking’s Will Trusts, [1967] 3 All E.R. 726
(Eng.).
150.
Speight v. Gaunt, (1883) 22 Ch. D. 727 at 756; Anker-Petersen v. Anker-Petersen, (1998)
12 T.L.I. 166 (Eng.). For its application in the U.S., see, for example, In re Will of Hartzell, 192 N.E.
2d 697, 706 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963); Estate of Talbot, 141 Cal. App. 2d 309, 296 P.2d 848 (1956) (a
trustee who yielded the exercise of his investment discretion and judgment to a beneficiary was held
to be in breach of trust).
151.
Trustee Act, 2000, § 11–15 (Eng.).
152. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9 (1994) (U.S); Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 § 403(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(2) (2012) (U.S.).
153.
Trusts Act 1973 s 54 (Austl.).
154.
One American commentator, however, argues that by abrogating the duty not to delegate,
modern trust law has reduced the incentive for trustees to make careful investment decisions, and
this reduced incentive has resulted in uncompensated losses for trust beneficiaries. He, therefore,
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to be drawn between “attempting to delegate a trust and obtaining professional help in the exercise of a trust.”155 Inasmuch as a trustee is entitled,
or sometimes obliged, to seek proper investment advice, the ultimate decision whether or not to invest or to invest in a particular manner rests
with him, subject only to any consent or direction required by the terms
of the trust.156 The trustee cannot abdicate the responsibility to a professional agent and thereby claim absolute immunity from trust liability.157
The well-known case of Learoyd v. Whiteley 158 nicely illustrates this
point. There, trustees invested trust funds on the security of a mortgage
of a freehold brickfield. They had duly obtained advice from a competent
firm of estate surveyors, which stated that the brickfield was a going
concern, with a caveat that it was nearly worked out. Both the English
Court of Appeal and House of Lords held the trustees liable for the resulting loss when the brickfield failed, for the report was not such as an
ordinary prudent man of business would have relied on in the conduct of
his own affairs if he was regardful of the pecuniary interests in the future
of those having claims upon him.
G. THE MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY
It seems convenient, at this juncture, to introduce the “modern portfolio
theory”159 which has undoubtedly gained considerable momentum in the
investment world.160 As Hoffmann, J., (as he then was) at first instance,
advocates for a return to a regime that entitles a trustee to seek and to pay for investment advice but
leaves the trustee as a guarantor for any breaches committed by the investment advisor. See Sterk,
supra note 35, at 855, 904.
155.
MAITLAND, supra note 4, at 94.
156.
Section 3(2) of the Trustee Investments Act has codified this rule. In the draft Trustee Bill
submitted to the Attorney-General of the Federation in 2011, the Nigerian Law Reform Commission
has proposed a reversal of the rule forbidding the trustee to delegate investment and management
functions.
157.
Re Knight’s Trusts, (1859) 54 E.R. 18 at 20; Stott v. Milne, (1884) 25 Ch. D. 710 at 714.
However, it would be difficult to establish a breach of trust where a trustee had in good faith relied
on expert advice, and such reliance may also entitle him to relief from trust liability under the
Trustee Act, 1893, s. 8; Judicial Trustees Act, 1896, s. 3 or Trustee Law, s. 45, whichever may be
applicable.
158.
(1887) 12 App. Cas. 727 (Eng.). See also the American case of Estate of Talbolt, 141 Cal.
App. 2d 309, 296 P. 2d 848 (1956), where a trustee who yielded the exercise of his investment
discretion and judgment to a beneficiary was held to be guilty of a breach of trust.
159.
The genesis of the theory is traceable to Harry Markowitz’s seminal article, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952).
160.
See generally B. LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT
MAN RULE (Oxford Univ. Press 1986); E. Ford, Trustee Investment and Modern Portfolio Theory,
10 T.L.I. 102 – 104 (1996); Lord Nicholls, supra note 17, at 75–76; Sterk, supra note 35.
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put it in Nestle v. National Westminster Bank Plc,161 “Modern trustees
acting within their investment powers are entitled to be judged by the
standards of current portfolio theory, which emphasizes the risk level of
the entire portfolio rather than the risk attaching to each investment taken
in isolation.” Surely, modern investment experts favour investment in a
balanced multi-sector portfolio as against wholesale investment in any
particular sector or line of business, however lucrative it is or may seem
at the moment. As has been noted,162 a balanced portfolio will have three
basic characteristics, namely liquidity, stability and growth. Such a portfolio should ideally comprise investments spread across equities, fixedincome stocks and bonds, bank deposits, real estate, and other suitable
investments. Further, while investing in equities,163 there should be a
horizontal spread among the major sectors of the market such ass financial services, oil and gas, consumer goods, information and communication technology, and so forth.164 The pith and substance of the modern
portfolio theory, therefore, is that the prudent investor should seek to
diversify risk, rather than avoid risk altogether.
The portfolio investment technique inevitably imports a duty upon trustees to undertake periodic reviews of the investments and to switch investments as may be necessary from time to time.165 It also compels the
engagement of experts, as portfolio investment seems too intricate for the
amateur trustee. The attraction of a balanced portfolio investment is that
the poor performance of some of the investments will be compensated by
the more productive ones and success will be judged by the overall performance. Also, long-term investments that typically yield lower (or
even no) income in the meantime will be balanced against short-term
income-producing ones so as to satisfy the disparate claims of the beneficiaries in an appropriate case. “It seems clear that well-diversified investment in accordance with the modern portfolio theory best meets the
interests of beneficiaries by providing a combination of safety and access
161.
Nestle v. National Westminster Bank Plc, [1988], unreported but transcribed in [1996] 10
(4) T.L.I. 112 at 115 (Eng.).; [2000] W.T.L.R. 795 at 802. See also J. W. v. Morgan Trust Company
of Bahamas Ltd, [2002] 4 I.T.E.L.R. 541.
162.
J. Stephens, Designing an Investment Portfolio for Trustees, 1 T & T (1994), cited in
WATT, TRUSTS AND EQUITY, supra note 2, at 402.
163.
Indeed, equity investment is the fulcrum on which the modern portfolio theory revolves.
164.
As the progenitor of the modern portfolio theory himself cautions, “It is necessary to avoid
investing in securities with high covariances among themselves. We should diversify across industries because firms in different industries, especially industries with different economic characteristics, have lower covariances than firms within an industry.” Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN.
77 89 (1952).
165.
Nestle v. National Westminster Bank Plc, [1994] 1 All E.R. 118 at 133, 140 (Eng.); see
also Trustee Act, 2000, § 4(2) (Eng.); Trusts Act 1973 s 22(3) (Austl.); Pension Reform Act No. (4)
(2014), §§ 57(f), 78(3)(b)–(d) (Nigeria).
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to the greatest possible funds.”166 Indeed, investing in accordance with
the modern portfolio theory is said to be the modern paradigm of
prudence.167
The modern portfolio theory has instigated the reformulation of the traditional approach to trust investing in many jurisdictions.168 As has been
observed,169 its implementation has brought about a sea change in modern trust law in at least three ways. First, it has eliminated the prohibition
on speculative investment. Secondly, it has imposed on trustee investors
a duty to diversify. Thirdly, to ensure that persons with an understanding
of portfolio theory make investment decisions, modern trust law has abrogated the traditional prohibition on delegating investment responsibilities and has instead sought to encourage such delegation.
Unfortunately, there are a number of obstacles in the way of the Nigerian
trustee investor wishing to take advantage of the modern portfolio theory, most notably the fact that the range of investment options open to
him remains overly restricted by both the extant statutes and rules of
equity. Thus, he is still enmeshed in the murky waters of statutory list of
trustee investments coupled with a complicated scheme of apportionment
of investments. For instance, unless authorized by the trust instrument,
he can neither invest in a private company nor in a start-up but prospective public company that is yet to meet the requirements of Nigerian
Stock Exchange listing or three-year dividend payouts, as stipulated in
the Trustee Investments Act.170 Besides, traditional trust law forbids the
delegation of his investment discretions unless permitted by the trust instrument. So, too, is his investment discretion still unduly fettered by the
obsolete rule that a trust investment has to be income-producing.
For the English trustee, the Trustee Act, 2000 has removed all such obstacles171 by authorizing him to invest as if he were an absolute benefi166.
Ford, supra note 167, at 103.
167.
LONGSTRETH, supra note 160, chap. 4. For a contrasting view, see Sterk, supra note 35, at
867 et seq.
168.
See, e.g., Trustee Act, 2000, §§ 3, 4, 5, 11, 15, Explanatory Note 25 (Eng.); UNIF. PRUDENT
INVESTOR ACT §§ 2, 3, 9 (1994) (U.S.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT
INVESTOR RULE § 80 (2007) (U.S.); Trusts Act 1973 ss 21, 24, 54 (Austl.); Superannuation Industry
(Supervision) Act 1993 s 52(2)(f) (Austl.); Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Trustee Investments:
The Modern Portfolio Theory, Rep. No. 101 (June 1999); British Columbia Law Institute, Total
Return Investing by Trustees, Rep. No. 16 (August 2001).
169.
Sterk, supra note 35, at 854; see also LONGSTRETH, supra note 160, at 12.
170.
Such as those that emerged in the wake of the recent privatization of public utilities and
recapitalization of banks, the shares of which savvy investors rushed to buy.
171.
For an excellent exposition of these obstacles and how they have been eliminated by the
current English legislation, see WATT, TRUSTS AND EQUITY, supra note 2, at 417–18.
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cial owner of the trust fund.172 For the avoidance of doubt, the
Explanatory Notes (note 25) which accompany the Act expressly state
that the “standard investment criteria” are intended to accord with the
modern portfolio theory. And, consistent with that note, the Law Commission for England and Wales has recognized that “The 2000 Act embraces modern portfolio investment theory in which the main concern of
the investor is to balance overall growth and overall risk.”173
Ironically, such carte blanche to invest in the same range of securities
and in the same manner as a prudent man would do with his own funds
had been conceded to trustee investors in the United States174 and Australia175 even before the idea was floated in England. In the United
States, it is known as the “prudent man rule,”176 the ancestry of which is
traceable to the State of Massachusetts.177 Moreover, the portfolio investment technique has since been a prominent feature of the American trust
investment laws and practices.178 In keeping with that philosophy, section 2 (c) of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act179 has set out eight basic
factors that should guide trustees in exercising their powers of investment and management of trust assets. The current position in the United
States is vividly captured in the following observation of one learned
commentator:
172.
Trustee Act, 2000, § 3 (Eng.); see also Pensions Act, 1995, § 34 (U.K.).
173.
Capital and Income in Trusts: Classification and Apportionment, 175 LAW COMM. C.P.
para. 1.3. (2004).
174.
V. Latham, Trustee Investment and American Practice, 7 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 139–55
(1954); M. A. Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary Investment in the
United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 OHIO ST. L.J. 491(1951).
175.
Section 21 of the Australian Trusts Act, 1973 provides that a trustee may, unless expressly
forbidden by the instrument creating the trust – (a) invest trust funds in any form of investment; and
(b) at any time vary an investment or realize an investment of trust funds and reinvest an amount
resulting from the realization in any form of investment.
176.
Whilst repudiating the “legal list” approach, the prudent man rule nevertheless forbade
speculative investment. As Putman, J., stated it, a trustee must “observe how men of prudence . . .
manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of
their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be
invested.” Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830).
177.
Latham, supra note 174, at 144–45; SCOTT, supra note 65, at 438. See also the leading case
of Harvard College v. Amory, id., which was the fons et origo of the rule; the Model Prudent Man
Rule Statute, 1942 which codified the rule (text of which is recited in Shattuck, supra note 174, at
508–09). There were, however, deviations in the States that adopted the “legal list” approach spurred
by the decision in King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869). See LONGSTRETH, supra note 160, at 11–12;
Sterk, supra note 35, at 856.
178.
J. H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81
IOWA L. REV., 641 (1996); E. Moses et al., Modern Portfolio Theory and the Prudent Investor Rule,
30 ACTEC J. 166 (2004); Sterk, supra note 35.
179.
For similar statutory guidelines, see section 24 of the Australian Trusts Act, 1973.
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The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and its ‘Prudent Investor
Rule’ fundamentally changed trust investment law with its new
emphasis on the portfolio as a whole rather than on individual
assets and its rejection of emphasizing strict avoidance of ‘risky
or speculative’ investments. Under the new rules no specific investment is inherently prudent or imprudent. Instead, suitability
to the trust account’s purposes and beneficiaries’ needs is considered the determinant . . . .
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act requires that trustees be familiar with modern portfolio theory and incorporate its principles into their investment strategies and documentation of their
actions.180

From the foregoing, it can be seen that whereas, in Nigeria, the suitability or risk of a particular trust investment would still be judged in isolation, in more pro-active jurisdictions, such as England, America and
Australia, it is now to be judged vis-à-vis the overall investment portfolio. Again, while the Nigerian trustee is still weighed down with the
shackles imposed on him by the non-delegation rule of equity,181 his
counterparts in those countries have been freed from such shackles.
There is, therefore, an urgent need for a paradigm shift so as to jolt the
Nigerian trustee investor to move away from the present position in
which he “wears a complacent air, because the virtue of safety will in
practice put a premium on inactivity.”182 The time has come for Nigerian
trustees to be liberated from conservative investment strategies which no
longer represent prudent investing but rather expose them to potential
liability for making “hazardous” or “speculative” investments or for delegating trust investment duty. Surely, such a transformation will be in the
best interests of trust beneficiaries who have been at the receiving end of
the current anachronistic regulatory regime. Fortunately, the modern
portfolio theory appears to be the philosophical underpinning of the Pension Reform Act183 as well as the Regulation on Investment of Pension
Fund Assets made by PenCom. This provides the basis for a distinct
expectation that any reform of the general trustee investment legislation
henceforth will take into account this rather progressive doctrine.
180.
K. Ziesenheim, Guidelines for Advisors on the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, available at
www.thornburginvestments.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
181.
As encoded in the Latin maxim “Delegatus non potest delegare.”
182.
Nestle v. National Westminster Bank Plc, [1994] 1 All E.R. 118 at 142 (Eng.).
183.
See Pension Reform Act No. (4) (2014), §§ 78, 86, re-enacting Pension Reform Act No.
(2) (2004), §§ 66, 73(1) (Nigeria).
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III. CONCLUSION
This work has undertaken a comparative review of the general principles
of equity and statutory rules guiding the discharge of a trustee’s investment duty and the exercise of his investment discretions under the Nigerian law vis-à-vis the laws of other common law countries. As has been
demonstrated, investment is virtually a universal obligation of trusteeship. It has also been revealed that the theoretical (as well as statutory)
framework for trust investment under the Nigerian law is largely outdated when compared with the current trends in other jurisdictions, notably England, United States of America, and Australia. Crucially, the
prospects of mandating Nigerian trustee investors to embrace the modern
portfolio theory, which is now the lodestar that guides trustee investors in
those jurisdictions, is still bedeviled by a number of obstacles imposed
by the obsolete received English law as well as the extant legislation
applicable in this country. In other jurisdictions, such obstacles have
been eliminated by legislation authorizing a trustee to invest as if he were
an absolute owner or a prudent man of business investing his own funds.
In order to align our law and practice with the current global trends,
therefore, the trust investment regulation in this country need to be liberalized. The starting point should be to do away with the relics of received
pre-1900 English statutes of general application that have since been buried in England but which, regrettably, still rule us from their graves.
Equally deserving of trashing are those antediluvian principles of equity
noted above which can no longer stand the test of validity under the
modern trust investment law. This should be followed with the enactment of a comprehensive Trustee Act dealing with all aspects of trusts in
which the modern principles of trust investment discussed herein shall be
captured. Nonetheless, considering, among other factors, the relatively
low standard of investment skills and high level of corruption184 in this
part of the world, it seems too great a risk to give the Nigerian trustee a
carte blanche to invest as if he were the absolute beneficial owner of
trust assets. As this writer stated elsewhere,185 the stage of development
in this country still calls for some sort of statutory red line to be drawn
for trustee investors.
184.
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2015) ranked Nigeria as No.
136 out of 168 countries surveyed. Corruption Perception Index 2015: Nigeria, TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, www.transparency.org/country/#NGA (last visited July 15, 2016). See also A-G of
Ondo State v. A-G of the Federation, [2002] 9 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 772) 222 (Nigeria).
185.
L. O. C. Chukwu, Half a Century of Trustee Investments Legislation in Nigeria: A Case for
Law Reform, 2 NIALS J. BUS. L. 178, 228 (2013) (suggesting also the modalities of the proposed
statutory reform).
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